tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5425214026242119706.post2908314854486409069..comments2023-03-21T09:20:06.347-04:00Comments on Libere: Are There No True Christians?linford86http://www.blogger.com/profile/09678367261958585376noreply@blogger.comBlogger9125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5425214026242119706.post-51541682409857843952012-09-04T13:50:48.961-04:002012-09-04T13:50:48.961-04:00But if we accept dialetheism, the overall argument...But if we accept dialetheism, the overall argument starts to fall through. Your main points are 1) a reductio of T, and 2) that even T-defenders admit that T is incomprehensible. But if we accept dialetheism, we can't use the method of reductio, so now 1) is out, and as I pointed out before, 2) is out as well.<br /><br />One could rejoinder that one still can't believe T, but that would put very strict requirements on belief; essentially you'd have to argue that we can't believe something we don't fully comprehend. <br /><br />Unless I missed something.Unknownhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00572288444207308564noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5425214026242119706.post-20132856294967585892012-09-03T14:24:42.015-04:002012-09-03T14:24:42.015-04:00Erm, Denys Turner is an example of an apophaticist...Erm, Denys Turner is an example of an apophaticist. I don't know if he would ascribe the "property" of existence to God (provided that existence is a predicate..... Sorry Kant!)linford86https://www.blogger.com/profile/09678367261958585376noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5425214026242119706.post-86765432456036540642012-09-03T12:34:23.142-04:002012-09-03T12:34:23.142-04:00So, yeah, there are definitely some intriguing iss...So, yeah, there are definitely some intriguing issues to be cashed out here concerning when its okay to have contradictions in our beliefs and what role they might play. I should also note, in passing, that some logicians have developed paraconsistent logics, which allow one to express contradictions without being explosive (in the technical sense.) This is basically just a generalisation of the notion of logical consistency, but it's worth mentioning because presumably someone out there has produced semantics for paraconsistent logics. However, I'm not well versed enough in that subject to really know what that would entail.<br /><br />As far as Law's argument, he describes this in more detail in "Believing Bullshit". He does actually give justification for the claim that intelligent agents are temporally bound (but you may not find it convincing, which is a different matter.) <br /><br />Intelligent agents, as we most commonly understand them, make decisions, have volition and wills, think various thoughts, and do things at particular times. These are all temporal notions and (arguably) are required for our understanding of what it means to be an intelligent agent with a mind (at least one that *does* anything.) In the case of the Christian God, He needs to decide to provide a savior for humanity at a particular time in human development, to flood the Earth after becoming angry about antediluvian peoples, to cast people out of the Garden after they disobey His will, etc. And the Bible is replete with God becoming angry and having other dispositional states that involve responses to human actions at particular times and places.<br /><br />Law compares this to mountains, which have particular kinds of spatial relationships implicit in their definition. He does state that we can use the word "mountain" to metaphorically describe some things which lack spatial relations (a mountain of guilt, for example) but then we're not really talking about mountains at all.<br /><br />A theist might be able to overcome Law's objection by stating that they're not really talking about an intelligent agent at all. There is actually a school of theology called Apophaticism which could (conceivably) take this avenue. According to Apophaticists, it's idolatrous to ascribe any properties whatsoever to God; cryptically, some have even claimed that conferring existence to God is idolatrous (Denys Turner is an example.) I could very easily see someone in that tradition claiming that God is not an intelligent agent at all. <br /><br />Karen Armstrong (who I don't think is an apophaticist) already writes that, "God is not a being at all."<br /><br />Daniel Dennett has pointed out that these kinds of cryptic gesticulations are common in sophisticated theology, but one wonders whether or not they are simply wilful obfuscation and obscurantism.<br /><br />Regardless of whether some skilled theologian can save theism through some high brow argument, the more relevant point for the discussion here is whether or not lay members of Christian communities believe those kind of sophisticated responses (even if they can't articulate them) or if they have some other picture in their minds.<br /><br />Given the high level of education that sophisticated theology requires as well as my anecdotal experience of talking to Christians, I would actually claim that most lay Christians do think of God as an intelligent agent who does act in time. For example, when Pat Robertson claimed on the 700 Club that Hurricane Katrina was God's punishment for America's abortion policy, this can only be rendered coherent (as far as I can tell) by stating:<br /><br />3. human beings have the ability to act of their own volition;<br />4. After human beings act (by doing things like making abortion policies), God can (and sometimes does) respond.<br /><br />Similar claims could be made about prayer.linford86https://www.blogger.com/profile/09678367261958585376noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5425214026242119706.post-70914433846385613492012-09-03T12:33:55.281-04:002012-09-03T12:33:55.281-04:00The conflict between GR+QM is deeply technical, an...The conflict between GR+QM is deeply technical, and, as far as I understand it, really involves a conflict between conjunctions of those theories and experimental observations; i.e. GR and QM are independently strongly confirmed in their relevant domains of inquiry, but (at least naive) conjunctions of the two produce results are strongly disconfirmed by empirical observations (many ways of cashing out that conjunction imply the non-existence of time, for example.)<br /><br />However, there are some caveats dealing with the GR+QM case that should be addressed (and that *do* appear to make a difference here.) These are:<br /><br />1. GR and QM are both only provisionally accepted. Even scientific realists don't think of them as absolute truth.<br />2. One might say that we only accept GR or QM in their relevant domains of inquiry. We don't expect either to work, or to even be true, in other domains. The conflicts between these two theories work in particularly exotic locations that are presumably outside of their proper domains and where we expect to find a new theory (at black holes, for example.) In fact, the conflict is seen as indicative that a new theory is needed.<br /><br />Strongly theological claims, like T, are not like (1) and (2). Explicitly, they are believed (by Christians) to be absolute truths and are not provisionally accepted. We can either see the idea of "domain of inquiry" as irrelevant or generalise it to some metaphysical claim (i.e. the domain of inquiry is all of Existence.) Christians do not believe T will eventually be replaced, precisely because T is believed to have been arrived at by divine revelation as opposed to induction.<br /><br />So while the scientist can partition off conflicts between our best scientific theories by claiming that these problems will eventually be resolved by some future scientific theory, T-defenders cannot do this.linford86https://www.blogger.com/profile/09678367261958585376noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5425214026242119706.post-33494423149348274912012-09-03T10:40:15.891-04:002012-09-03T10:40:15.891-04:00I don't know enough about GR + QM to really co...I don't know enough about GR + QM to really comment on that... but are they necessarily contradictory or is it just that the details of QM have not been thoroughly worked out yet? We've used conflicting theories before without believing contradictions, for pragmatic reasons (I'm thinking of the use of Newton's laws). Because in the case of T, there is no getting around the contradiction... it is necessarily contradictory. <br /><br />If you want to maintain the ability to believe a contradiction and be rational, then you have a problem, because unlike what you claim, the T-defenders DON'T say they have absolutely no comprehension of that which they believe: it's not nonsense along the lines of piggly wiggle tiggle. You would have to somehow argue that some contradictions are ok to believe and some are not-- I'm not sure how one would go about doing that.<br /><br />One of my other points that I didn't mention last night is that Stephen Law (or you describing Law's position) doesn't give a justification for his posit that intelligent agents must be temporally bound-- why? Sure, he can posit that and say that it's incoherent to say otherwise, but that's not a good argument. I can posit the same thing on the other side, should I want to.<br /><br />My 3rd point dissolved, and I actually decided I agreed with you on it. I hope you glean some enjoyment from that!<br />Unknownhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00572288444207308564noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5425214026242119706.post-46614956639730661052012-09-02T23:56:18.736-04:002012-09-02T23:56:18.736-04:00Perhaps the best response for me to give would be ...Perhaps the best response for me to give would be to just cite the contradiction. But then I'm worried about something like the following...<br /><br />If Sam believes x, then one might think that Sam has committed himself to believing all of the implications of x. So, if a scientific realist provisionally accepts belief in both General Relativity and Quantum Mechanics, they should provisionally believe all of the implications of both. But since GR and QM are not compatible with each other, one could end up believing a contradiction (if a contradiction is implied by GR+QM.)<br /><br />Or, for example, there is Quine's argument from his 2 Dogmas paper. Given a sufficiently complex web of beliefs, one can sort of accidentally end up believing a contradiction (or, at the very least, believing two propositions which contradict each other.)<br /><br />So, it seems that one might be capable of believing contradictions (at least provisionally) and sometimes for good reasons (in particular, the GR+QM case.)<br /><br />The only way around this would seem to be to deny that believing x involves *also* believing all of the implications of x. But I'm not sure I'm satisfied with that either...linford86https://www.blogger.com/profile/09678367261958585376noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5425214026242119706.post-20310937261134511912012-09-02T21:37:20.447-04:002012-09-02T21:37:20.447-04:00.Interesting. I think you're (obviously) right....Interesting. I think you're (obviously) right to point out that T is contradictory: we need not even put it in formal logic to see that. (I'm surprised that calling the 3 "Persons" is what is endorsed.) That alone suggests that one cannot rationally believe T, and depending on what our conception of society is, T-believers should be excluded from public discourse...at least, this is what someone like Rawls would say.<br />But T-defenders seem to embrace openly that their belief breaks rules of rationality and go to the mystery claim. Yet your criticism of this seems a bit unfair: the defenses you give don't suggest that we have NO understanding of T (so not the same as with P), but that our understanding is "partial" and not "clearly grasped". This doesn't suggest an admission of meaninglessness to me. That the concepts are not clearly grasped does not suggest meaninglessness--we have lots of vague, nebulous concepts where our understanding could be described as partial or unclear--but that it is contradictory DOES. What meaning does a contradiction have in any form? "It is raining and not raining"-- I suppose there may be an account of meaning that could say such a contradiction has meaning, but I'm not aware of one. If T-defenders are going to reject logic and standard reason, they need to give a sufficient and alternative theory of meaning to explain their defense, and it would seem they haven't done so. It seems doubtful that they can expect to make room for T and keep everything else (e.g., the account of what it is for something to MEAN something and for us to be able to UNDERSTAND something) the same as "standard" (loosely speaking... I'm getting lazy because I'm writing this on a cell phone...)<br />i think what they say is nonsense because they appear to be speaking a different language, and yet they do not make that clear and so they are mashing various concepts together. Perhaps I'm too embedded in analytic philosophy, but I can't separate the theories of meaning with which I'm familiar from the logic T-defenders have openly abandoned. I have two other things but they shall have to wait... Unknownhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00572288444207308564noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5425214026242119706.post-54104776021088864482012-09-02T18:25:27.587-04:002012-09-02T18:25:27.587-04:00I have had a discussion about this recently. Most ...I have had a discussion about this recently. Most atheists describe themselves as agnostic atheists as they do not know for a fact that god(s) do not exist. Most theists who do not have proof that their god(s) exist could also rightly be called agnostic theists. So a case could be made that every human is an agnostic of some sort. Not a position I agree with, but one that could be argued. So theists take the term agnostic to mean that atheists do not deny the existence of God. By their logic, if one does not deny the existence of God, then one admits it. Therefore, they conclude, atheists do not exist. They confuse (intentionally or otherwise) the two concepts; "I personally do not know if God exists" and "it is not possible for anyone to know if God exists". This is one of the reasons I am so reticent to use the term agnostic atheist. <br /><br />I think I would be closer to being a gnostic atheist than an agnostic atheist. I dislike the term agnostic. The definition of agnostic can vary depending on who is using it. Also agnostic is also used by itself instead of as a qualifier for theist or atheist, to describe a level of belief. Language to describe an atheist is imprecise. For example in the OED and atheist is "a person who disbelieves or lacks belief in the existence of God or gods". So a person who says "I do not believe in god(s)" and "I do not believe that god(s) exist(s)" are described by the same definition. I cannot help but feel that these 2 positions are -not- in fact the same.<br /><br />Also the way agnostic is generally used implies something about how the world works. Agnostic is commonly used to describe the idea that god(s) may exist but it is or may be unknowable. I take a contrary position that in the absence of any evidence to the contrary the decision must be made that god(s) do/does not exist.<br /><br />The main problem with these descriptions is that language cannot always accurately convey an idea accurately. One can stating ones belief in terms that are correct according to the dictionary and the conventions used by scholars and experts in a subject. However when speaking to people in general, this vocabulary can express another idea to the listener and lead to not communicating the actual belief correctly. This difference between the correct meaning of words and how they are actually used is certainly a large barrier in discussing theism and atheism. It would be necessary to begin every conversation by defining all the terms to be used.<br /><br />I have been examining Ignosticism to see if this is a description that more accurately communicates my position. I would probably use the term Ignostic when discussing with other atheists and gnostic atheist when addressing people in general. Not because I have flip-flopping beliefs, but in order to more accurately communicate an idea.<br /><br />The other problem is the starting point. People spent a lot of time dissecting belief and levels of certainty of belief. What they do not do before hand is define, "What is God"? God is a concept that can mean hundreds of different things. Unless this starting point can be clearly defined, it is of no use to start down the path to describe ones belief or lack thereof regarding this concept.mooglierhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10709270738268194845noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5425214026242119706.post-15772444432165185222012-09-02T17:54:50.765-04:002012-09-02T17:54:50.765-04:00Nicely done, Dan & though it mirrors Comfort&#...Nicely done, Dan & though it mirrors Comfort's argument, yours is intellectually honest & honestly inquisitive.Emilyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01198308922454511888noreply@blogger.com